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Law Partner of Class Plaintiff Barred from Serving
as Class Counsel: Kramer v. Scientific
Control Corp.
Plaintiff law partners jointly purchased shares in Scientific Control Cor-
poration and later sold them at a loss. After receiving an SEC questionnaire
concerning the shares the two filed suit against the corporation,' alleging
that the corporation's prospectus and reports had contained omissions and
material misrepresentations in violation of the Securities Acts of 1933 and
1934 and of the common law.2 The complaint was filed and signed by an
associate in plaintiffs' law firm and was later amended to include a motion
for certification as a class action. The motion named both plaintiffs as
representatives of a class described as individuals who, relying on the
reports and prospectus, had purchased Scientific Control stock. Certifica-
tion to proceed as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3) was granted by the district court over defendants' objection that the
motive of plaintiffs in bringing suit as a class action was to benefit from
court-awarded attorneys' fees. 3 Defendants' motion to disqualify plaintiffs
as representatives on grounds of irreconcilable conflict of interest resulting
from their roles as named plaintiffs and as associates 4 in the firm acting as
counsel was denied by the district court.5 Appeal was taken to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Held: appeal of class certifi-
cation denied; reversed as to permission to act as class counsel. The Code of
Professional Responsibility requires that no member of the bar who main-
tains an employment relationship with an attorney class representative dur-
ing the preparation or pendency of a class action may serve as counsel to the
class if the action might result in the creation of a fund from which award of
attorneys' fees would be appropriate. Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp.,
534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 90, 50 L. Ed. 2d 94 (1976).
I. REQUIREMENT OF ADEQUATE CLASS REPRESENTATION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that all class actions be
adequately represented. 6 Representation of a class may be viewed as encom-
I. Other defendants were appellant Arthur Anderson & Co., a public accounting firm;
H.L. Federman & Co., an underwriting firm; Kleiner, Bell & Co., the principal underwriters of
Scientific Control's issuance of shares; and sixteen officers or directors of Scientific Control.
2. Allegations were made claiming violations of Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12(2), 15,
17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 17k, 771(2), 77q(a) (1970), and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(a)(4),
10(b), 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a) (4), 78j(b), 78r (1970). The common law claims were based on
pendent jurisdication.
3. 64 F.R.D. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The court determined that certification was proper even
if plaintiffs' motives were as alleged by defendants since rule 23(a)(4) had been satisfied and an
opposite holding would penalize class members. Improper motive was at issue only later when
the determination of damages and attorney's fee awards were made.
4. The decision extends not only to partners acting as class counsel, but to attorney-
employees or office associates.
5. 67 F.R.D. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The court also denied defendant's request for certifica-
tion to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (1966). The rule requires plaintiffs to satisfy three additional
prerequisites in order to maintain the action as a class: (I) the class is so numerous that joinder
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passing both the role of the named plaintiffs and the role of the attorney for
the class, for each is bound by rule 23 to place the interests of the absent
class members properly before the courts.7 One type of suit which is pecul-
iarly adaptable to class action litigation is the stockholders' suit because an
individual shareholder may face a tremendous burden in shouldering costs
of complicated litigation when he has only a small claim. 8 In this type of
class action the requirement of adequate representation has received special
scrutiny by the courts. Because members of the class not before the court
will be bound by its adjudication, due process requires that representatives
possess interests which are coextensive with other members of the class. 9
Although interests of members will vary within the class according to
amounts paid for the securities, the nature of the transactions, and the
purpose or plan for which the investments were made, courts test mainte-
nance of this form of proceeding by whether common facts or questions of
law are those upon which the plaintiff seeks to represent the class. 10 Addi-
tionally, courts recognize a fiduciary aspect to the representative role and
require that the acts of the class representative reflect an allegiance to the
absent members whose interests, by definition, are in harmony with his
own.
1 1
A second consideration of adequacy of representation is the role of class
counsel. Rule 23 demands "vigorous" representation, and courts have rec-
ognized an enthusiasm incentive in the substantial contingent fees which
may be awarded counsel in class actions. 2 Although rule 23 makes no
provision for payment of attorneys' fees in class actions, fees are generally
awarded under the "equitable fund" doctrine.' 3 The lawyer in the class
action will be considered for such a fee only after effectuating settlement or
a successful judgment, 14 and class actions have been criticized for the
of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class. See generally 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.04-.06.2 (2d ed. 1976).
7. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), in which the court stated the
criterion for determining adequate representation of the class as being whether the representa-
tive will vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel. See also
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
8. See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Comment,
Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies
Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 889 (1968).
9. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Hansberry was decided before revision of rule
23, but the rule with respect to adequacy of representation remains unchanged.
10. See Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
which states that the test is the "forthrightness and vigor with which the representative party
can be expected to assert and defend the interests of the members of the class. ... See also
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
11. Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973).
12. Courts have characterized the lawyer's interest in a substantial fee as being a healthy
indication of vigorous representation, and, therefore, an acceptable inducement. Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d
Cir. 1973); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Kronenberg v. Hotel
Governor Clinton, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
13. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders,
Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). See generally
3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.91 (2d ed. 1976); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1803, at 284 (1972).
14. See Comment, Computing Attorney's Fees in Class Actions: Recent Judicial
Guidelines, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 630 (1975).
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sizeable attorneys' fees created thereby. 5
Moreover, impetus to settle is greater in a class action context than in
other contingent fee situations. 6 As Judge Friendly has pointed out,' 7 a
small settlement in a class action suit may prove more rewarding than a large
judgment obtained only after costly trial and appellate procedures. In addi-
tion, the risk of losing in trial can be disastrous for the plaintiff's attorney
since it means that years of effort on his part go uncompensated."8 Counsel
for the class, therefore, may often have the greatest amount at stake, both in
terms of potential dollar recovery and of significance of risks involved. In
noting these considerations which push the lawyer to settle in class actions, 9
courts have tried to provide special judicial discretion in giving or with-
holding approval of class action settlement or fees.2 °
II. DUAL REPRESENTATION: CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Judicial examination of qualification of counsel for the class has focused
on skill, 2 1 experience, 22 propriety of behavior, 23 and possible conflict of
interest affecting the course of litigation. Conflict of interest may arise when
the person representing the class as named plaintiff also acts as class
counsel. For example, the court in Graybeal v. American Savings & Loan
Association24 disallowed class action status because of potential conflict of
interest affecting protection of the class; the individual acting in the role of
class attorney had an interest in a court award of a large legal fee and also an
interest in a much smaller damage recovery as the class representative. 25
The court noted that temptation to engage in improper conduct increases as
the financial disparity between the two interests becomes greater. 26
Faced with the dual role problem, courts have used differing analyses in
15. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968); Free World Foreign
Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
16. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4
J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 51 (1975).
17. Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972).
18. Id.; cf. Pete v. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 517 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (premium allowed above attorneys' hourly compensation to reflect the magnitude of risk
assumed by class counsel).
19. Another inducement to settle is a "bird-in-the-hand" theory, suggested in Allegheny
Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964), which implies that a settlement "in the hand"
may be much more desirable than a larger but distant and speculative judgment "in the bush."
Id.
20. Courts also require that class members receive notice and an opportunity to air their
views, provided the degree of notice required does not cause prejudice to the named plaintiff.
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); Berland
v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.
1972) (lawyers, with approval of supervising judge, may settle over objection of the representa-
tive plaintiff).
21. See, e.g., Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448 (D. Ariz. 1971).
22. Felton v. Walston & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,490 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Ariz. 1972).
23. Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1972).
24. 59 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C, 1973).
25. Cf. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Il. 1972) (court used a balancing
of the two interests to hold that the attorney was not a fair and adequate representative of the
class).
26. See In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1974). The court
refused certification to a class of over a million plaintiffs each of whose average recovery was
estimated to be two dollars. Courts have noted, however, that even when plaintiffs' claims may
be so small as to fail to satisfy administrative costs, in some instances deterrence may serve as a
worthwhile justification for the litigation. See Dam, supra note 16, at 60-61.
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an effort to remedy potential conflicts of interest. In Lamb v. United
Security Life Co.2 7 the court allowed an attorney to act as both class
representative and as class counsel. The court adopted an "after-the-fact"
approach and held that when settlement or judgment arrived, the judge's
discretion in determining the propriety and amount of attorneys' fees would
reflect any conflict which had occurred.2" In a similar case, Kriger v. Euro-
pean Health Spa Inc. ,29 the attorney serving as named plaintiff was asso-
ciated with the law firm serving as counsel to the class action. In finding the
representative less capable than others the court denied class action certifi-
cation, basing its finding on the possibility of the representative's testimony
forcing his firm's withdrawal from the case.3" In Cotchett v. Avis Rent a Car
System 31 the attorney representative had a potential recovery as a class
member which was much less than the financial interest he might have had
in the legal fees engendered by the lawsuit.32 The propriety of such an
arrangement was further cast into doubt by the consideration that the
individual members of the class were unlikely to receive any substantial
benefit from a successful prosecution of the suit, but instead might ulti-
mately have to pay for it through subsequently increased costs of car
rentals."
III. KRAMER V. SCIENTIFIC CONTROL CORP.
The Third Circuit denied defendant's appeal of error regarding class
certification in the district court on procedural grounds, repeating its rule
that without trial court appeal certification appellate jurisdiction in class
action matters would not be exercised. 34 The court did, however, accept a
hearing of the issue of alleged impropriety of the class counsel, noting that
the matter was of sufficient importance to invoke the collateral order rule. 35
The district court, in dealing with the dual role situation, had determined
that judicial control over fee payment would provide correction for abuses 36
27. 59 F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1972); cf. Residex Corp. v. Farrow, 20 FED. RULES SERV. 2d
97, 23a.52 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1975) (fact that plaintiff-attorney was a member of a law firm that
instituted an action on his behalf was not determinative of the issue of adequacy of
representation).
28. 59 F.R.D. 25, 31 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
29. 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
30. Id. at 106. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9 provides in part: "The
roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an advocate is to advance
or argue the cause of another, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively."
31. 56 F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
32. Id. at 554.
33. Id. With an estimated class of 500,000, plaintiffs in this case alleged illegal assessment
of a one-dollar surcharge on car rentals. Id. at 551.
34. 534 F.2d at 1087. In Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 925 (1972), the Third Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in rejecting claimed appealabil-
ity under the collateral order doctrine and the death knell doctrine regarding class action
certification. The collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949), allows appeal when the right determined by the lower court is separable from and
collateral to the merits of the case; the issue is too important to deny interlocutory review since
rights may be irFetrievably lost during the delay which occurs while awaiting full and finaljudgment. The death knell doctrine provides a right to appeal when the effect of an unreviewed
order tolls the death of the action. The Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have
ruled differently. See also Note, Appeals Under28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607, 613
(1975).
35. The appeal was accepted under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), the collateral order exception
of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
36. Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 365 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
[Vol. 31
excluding considerations of effectiveness of counsel during pendency and
the possible appearance of impropriety created to laymen. On review the
court of appeals applied the guidelines of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility and refused to rule on issues of factual impropriety.3 7 Noting that
Pennsylvania's local rule 138 incorporated the canons of the code, the Third
Circuit grounded its decision squarely on canon 9.
Canon 9 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Respon-
sibility states, "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Profes-
sional Impropriety." 39 The standard has been applied in areas where, despite
the absence of wrongdoing, public confidence might be lessened by the
appearance of factual circumstances indicating wrongdoing.' The ABA has
clearly stated its desire that propriety regarding a lawyer's conduct extend to
those sharing some measure of association.4 The relationship between
partners in a law firm is such that neither the firm nor any member as-
sociated with the firm may accept any professional employment which any
member of the firm cannot properly accept.4 2
Canon 9 speaks to the appearance of propriety of counsel's acts rather
than propriety in fact and uses as the standard whether a layman would
consider the contested conduct improper in light of the attendant circum-
stances.4 3 In applying this standard the court concluded that laymen would,
in fact, consider the situation as appearing improper because of the lay view
of a partnership as an association of sharing. 4 Thus, an attorney serving as
class representative faces a conflict of interest both when he or when one
associated with him serves also as class counsel; 45 the potential conflict in
either situation becomes equal under the partnership analysis. The court
found that the disqualification of counsel was an appropriate remedy for the
problem of conflict of interest which flies in the face of the adequate repre-
sentation requirement. 46
By applying the general mandate of canon 9, the Third Circuit announced
a rule unhampered by the necessity of weighing individual facts and cir-
37. The court did not reach a determination of the adequacy of representation of the named
attorney-plaintiffs or inquire into possible improper solicitation of class members or improper
motives for bringing suit as a class for gain of large attorneys' fees.
38. "The canons of ethics of the American Bar Association as now existing shall be and as
hereafter modified shall become standards of conduct for attorneys of this Court." PA. R. Civ.
P. 11.
39. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9.
40. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974) (attorney
disqualified when his past employment for defendant was held to appear to be of the same
subject matter as the current litigation, and, thus, constituted violations of canon 9 and DR
9- 101(b)).
41. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, Nos. 49 (1931), 72 (1932).
42. Id.
43. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-2 states: "[O]n occasion ethical
conduct may appear to laymen to be unethical . . . . A lawyer should guard against otherwise
proper conduct that has a tendency to diminish public confidence in the legal system or in the
legal profession."
44. 534 F.2d at 1091-92.
45. See notes 4, 41 supra.
46. Cf. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 547 (N.D. I1. 1972) (named plaintiff
was also acting as co-counsel for the litigation; the court stated that "[s]ince there are other
attorneys seeking to represent the class in the suit, the conflict should be and can be promptly
eliminated. ").
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